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Nietzsche and Nishitani 
on the Self through Time
Graham Parkes
Precisely the least, the softest, lightest, a 
lizard's rustling, a breath, a flash, a 
moment—a little makes the way of the best 
happiness. Still!
What happened to me? Listen! Didn’t time 
just fly away? Am I not falling? Didn’t I 
fall—listen! into the well of eternity?
Zarathustra, “Midday”
Both Nietzsche and the Buddha effected profound revolutions in the 
way the self and the world and their interrelations are to be understood. 
Not only was Nietzsche aware of the transvaluation of metaphysical values 
of some two-and-a-half millennia earlier, but he also realized that the 
movement of his own thought in many ways paralleled the previous 
“paradigm shift.” He frequently draws attention to the analogy between 
the spiritual and intellectual crises that arose in sixth-century b.c. India 
and nineteenth-century Europe, and expresses admiration for the Bud­
dha’s rejection of prevailing metaphysics, especially as manifest in his 
denial of the Upanishadic notion of the eternal and immutable self. A 
recent study by Freny Mistry, entitled Nietzsche and Buddhism,1 pro­
1 Freny Mistry, Nietzsche and Buddhism (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1981)— 
henceforth referred to as **NB” followed by the page number. The author does an ex­
cellent job of documenting the sources of Nietzsche’s acquaintance with Buddhist thought, 
distinguishing his references to Buddhism based on genuine understanding from those 
based on misunderstanding, suggesting possible influences on the development of Nietz­
sche’s ideas, and drawing the significant parallels between the two philosophies against 
the background of the (relatively minor) differences. An insightful and sensitive treat­
ment of the topic of the selfs relation to time (on which the final part of the present 
essay leans rather heavily) is to be found in Joan Stambaugh’s Nietzsche's Thought of 
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vides a comprehensive and perceptive comparison of Nietzsche’s thought 
with the ideas of Theravada and Hinayana Buddhism; it would be in­
structive to pursue the parallels through the Mahayana tradition to its 
culmination in Zen.
Such a comparison finds much of the ground already prepared by the 
work of Nishitani Keiji. While Professor Nishitani’s thought is rooted 
in the study and practice of Zen, he has also been influenced by a number 
of Western thinkers: primarily Eckhart, Schelling, Kierkegaard, Nietz­
sche and Heidegger—amongst whom Nietzsche’s thought has exerted the 
most power.2 Given the difference in “atmosphere” between Nietzsche 
and Zen—the extreme, crazed, and often violent passion of the former, 
and the calm serenity of the latter—the congruence in other respects, 
and the fact that a thinker such as Nishitani has found Nietzsche’s thought 
so congenial, should perhaps surprise us more than they do.
Eternal Return (Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972)— 
henceforth **NER.” Professor Stambaugh hints at the congruence of her interpretation 
of Nietzsche’s view of time and eternity with later Buddhist ideas, but does not articulate 
it.
2 Keiji Nishitani, Was 1st Religion?, trans. Dora Fischer-Barnicol (Frankfurt: Insel, 
1982); Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Lon­
don: University of California Press, 1982). Because only the German edition was available 
to me in writing the initial draft of this paper, and since it was completely proofed by 
the author and in the process considerably expanded, I shall cite the text by way of my 
own translations from the German edition, referring to it as “G” followed by the page 
number, adding references to the English translation, abbreviated as “B,” where possible.
While there is considerable agreement between Nietzsche and Buddhism 
with respect to all three “characteristics of existence”— duhkha (suffer­
ing, frustration, unsatisfactoriness), anitya (impermanence), and anal- 
man (no-self)—our major concern will be with this last. But since the 
self cannot legitimately be considered in isolation from existence in 
general, I shall begin with a brief consideration of anitya, followed by 
a general sketch of anatman, before proceeding to the question of time. 
It is this last move that motivates the comparison: both inquiries into 
the nature of the self, stemming from quite different cultural and in­
tellectual traditions, find it to be essentially insubstantial, and are thus 
drawn into the problem of the selfs relation to time. Since this has been 
a central and perplexing issue throughout the course of both traditions, 
a comparative approach may serve to effect some bilateral illumination.
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Further, while Nishitani sees his thought as corresponding to Nietzsche’s 
to a considerable extent, he appears also to think that they ultimately 
diverge—on the problematic of temporality. Since I have some doubts 
about this, a subsidiary intention here is to see how much farther the 
parallels can be drawn.
Self Without Substance
Given the split between self and world on the conventional level of 
understanding, both Nietzsche and Buddhism hold that false views of 
the self arise concomitantly with distortions of the true nature of the 
world. On the conventional view, the world, while admittedly changing 
over time, consists at least in part of certain stable, self-identical entities. 
But this is to be seen through as an illusion, a fabrication on the part 
of the self in an effort to shore up the shaky belief in its own substan­
tiality. The true nature of the world is that everything is anitya, imper­
manent, in a state of constant flux. The self-identical thing is a fiction, 
a construction, a calculated petrification of the incessant flow of ever­
changing dharmas—or, in terms of a different kind of philosophy, a syn­
thesis of a serial multiplicity of “sense data” at different times from 
various perspectives.
Not only, on the basis of craving and attachment to the self, do we 
project the illusion of unitary, self-identical things, but we also, in a fur­
ther attempt to maintain our discrete individuality, phantasize the fig­
ment of the separate, isolated and independent thing. Opposed to this 
are the idea of dependent arising (pratltya-samutpada) in Buddhism and 
Nietzsche’s conception of the universe as a field of interrelated forces 
(cf. NB 74-9). Both views, of dharmas continually flashing in and out 
of existence, and of a protean flux of quanta of energy (will to power), 
stand in radical opposition to the conventional “substance” view of reality 
as grounded in some kind of material substratum that persists through 
time?
Two such alternative ways of seeing the world imply two “phases” 
to the self, an authentic and an inauthentic, and that the true self is a *
3 One of Nietzsche’s most satisfying attacks on the obsession with substance is aphorism 
12 of Beyond Good and Evil.
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task to be accomplished rather something simply given. As Nietzsche 
frequently puts it, we have to “become what we are”; or, as Nishitani 
says in talking of the Buddha-way: “[Man] is a task for himself” and 
has to “become himself” and “make himself into himself* (G 391, E 
261). The inauthentic self, the self as substance, is a construct fabricated 
in response to the duhkha, or uneasiness, generated by our finding 
ourselves afloat in a ocean of impermanence. Nietzsche writes: “I take 
the I itself to be a thought construction of the same rank as ‘matter,* 
‘thing,’ ‘substance,’ etc.... so only as a regulative fiction with the help 
of which a kind of constancy, and therefore ‘knowability,’ is placed or 
invented into a world of becoming.”4 5
4 The Kritische Gesamtausgabe of Nietzsche’s Werke edited by Colli and Montinari 
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967-82), vol. VII, 3; 35 [35] 248. (This and all subsequent transla­
tions from the original German are my own.) Nietzsche’s most mature formulations of 
this idea are to be found in Twilight of the Idols III, 5 and VI, 3; cf. also The Will 
to Power (hereafter FFP” followed by the section number), sections 485, 558, 561 and 
635.
5 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Prologue section 4. References to Zarathustra will be ab­
breviated “Z” and followed by the book and section number.
The task of self-overcoming is difficult and never-ending, since the 
“I” is a hard nut to crack, having (as the practice of zazen makes pain­
fully clear) an uncanny ability continually to re-assert itself, just when 
its dissolution appears to have been consummated. The task is painful 
because it involves the death of the former self: Zen texts speak frequently 
of the “Great Death” to be undergone before the true self can be real­
ized. The theme of death, and of its inseparability from life, is central 
to Nishitani’s work (though his treatment is reminiscent of Heidegger’s 
perhaps more than of Nietzsche’s): he speaks often of the need to “die 
to ourselves ... in order to re-awaken to our self’ (G 81).
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra offers an account of the arduous process of 
self-overcoming (uberwinden), in which the transition to the true self 
involves the selfs going under (untergehen), dying away from itself, in 
order to go over, or across (ubergehen), to the condition of the over­
man (Ubermensch), for whom “all things become his death {Untergang}? 
When the task is creation, and especially creation of a new self, “there 
must be much bitter dying in your lives, you creators!” (Z II, 2). The 
task of self-transformation is often envisioned elementally, especially in 
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images of water (as we shall see shortly) and fire. Just as fire is a recur­
ring image in the Buddhist tradition for the self-engendered power that 
burns out the calcified and desiccated self, thus recommends Zarathustra 
in an alchemical vein: “You must want to consume yourself in your own 
flame: how could you want to become new unless you had first become 
ashes!” (Z I, 17).
The strength of egoism derives in part from the substantial selfs be­
ing considered unitary: a self dissolved into a multiplicity has far less 
chance of maintaining its self-identity over time. Against the idea of the 
unitary, indivisible atman (albeit a unity capable of uniting with the 
greater Unity of Brahman), the Buddha’s analysis of the self dissolved 
it into a variety of groups of dharmas, samskdras, skandhas, and so 
forth—all of which he held to be anatman, all impermanent, all empty 
of self-nature. Further, these various groups of multiplicities are to be 
understood as forms, arrangements or relationships, rather than as 
substantial entities.
However, given their frequency, it is surprising that Nietzsche’s cor­
responding analyses of the self have been so little commented on. Working 
alchemically away under the crazed eye of Dionysos, patron par excellence 
of dissolution, Nietzsche patiently deconstructs the self variously into 
multiplicities of persons or souls, drives or instincts, and energies or in­
terpretations.6 In The Birth of Tragedy he paints a vivid picture of the 
personality of the literary artist (and, by extension, of the “non-inspired” 
person too) as consisting of a multiplicity of “alive persons ... bodies 
and souls.7 And when he later speaks approvingly of one who “in con­
trast to the metaphysicians, is glad to harbour within himself not ‘one 
immortal soul’ but many mortal souls” we should take those italics
6 For a detailed account of these analyses see of my essay “Many Mortal Souls: Nietz­
sche, Freud and Jung on the Multiple Psyche’’ (forthcoming); cf. also Mistry, NB ch. 
II, and J. Hillis Miller, “The Disarticulation of the Self in Nietzsche,’’ The Monist, 
vol. 64, no. 2, 1981.
7 The Birth of Tragedy, section 8. I have suggested in the essay mentioned in the 
preceding note that the multiple souls or subjects or persons of which Nietzsche speaks 
(and of which the text of Zarathustra provides the consummate exemplification) can 
fruitfully be understood as prefiguring the autonomous “counter-wills’* (Gegenwilieri) 
of the early Freud and the “splinter-psyches,” feeling-toned complexes and archetypal 
personalities discussed by Jung.
59
PARKES
seriously.8
8 Human, Ail-Too-Human, II, 1, 17.
In his account of the genesis of these intra-psychic personalities, Nietz­
sche (anticipating the genealogies offered by Freud and Jung) suggests 
that they arise from the operations of the imagination upon drives (Triebe) 
that have been retroflected upon the self as a result of having been denied 
discharge: “The thirst for enmity, cruelty, revenge, violence, turns 
back ... and [in concert with the imagination] the drives are trans­
formed into demons whom one fights” (WP 376). One is reminded of 
the Buddha’s struggle with the hordes of MSra just prior to recollecting 
his manifold past lives and attaining enlightenment; also of the ways in 
which certain schools of Vajrayana Buddhism advocate dealing with the 
daemonic personalities encountered on the path of meditation, as per­
sonifications of the meditator’s drives.
A further step back in Nietzsche’s genealogical account understands 
the drives as flows of energies, which are de-substantialized even fur­
ther through being understood as perspectival interpretations. Conso­
nant with the Buddhist understanding of the falsifying power of crav­
ings and attachments, Nietzsche writes: “It is our needs that interpret 
the world; our drives and their for and against. Every drive is a kind 
of lust to rule, each one has its perspective . ..” (WP 481). Since it is 
ultimately will to power that interprets, Nietzsche’s picture of the self 
is of a force-field of interpretations interfused with the oceanic flux of 
interpretative energies that constitutes the universe as a whole.
The dissolution of the self into multiplicity has the effect of breaking 
down its encapsulation and opening up its isolation from the outside 
world. In the West, the paradigm of the self-centred, encapsulated self 
is the Cartesian ego, which, as res cogitans in splendid isolation from 
res extensa outside, observes in dispassionate detachment a realm utter­
ly separate and different in nature from itself, and is thereby able to ex­
ert control over a world of dead, inanimate objects.
Nishitani frequently discusses this conception of the self, and sees it 
as symptomatic also (though to a lesser degree) of a false understanding 
of the self in the Eastern tradition. He talks of our “contemplating things 
from within the fortress of the self. .. seeing things merely as objects.” 
This results in a self “alienated from things ... encapsulated in itself. .. 
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a self that is always object-like." He contrasts this “self-enclosed” self 
with a condition in which we forget the self and “ourselves become the 
things that we perceive” (G 49-57, E 9-13). He interprets the haiku 
poet Bashd’s injunction, “What goes on with the fir-tree, learn from 
the fir; what goes on with the bamboo, learn from the bamboo” as mean­
ing: “Transpose yourself into the way of being in which the fir is the 
fir itself and the bamboo the bamboo itself* (G 212, E 128). Ddgen 
describes such self-transformation by saying: “To learn the Buddha-way 
is to learn one’s self. To learn one’s self is to forget one’s self. To forget 
one’s self is to be corroborated by all things [dharmas]. To be cor­
roborated by all things is to let one’s own *body/soul’ as well as the selves 
of others fall away” (Genjdkdan: quoted in G 306, E 107-108).
In Western terms we could describe the dissolution of the Cartesian 
ego as a move away from detached observation that re-opens the self 
to a reflective participation in the world.9 Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is on 
one level a depiction of this process, imagined as the psyche’s being 
stimulated by er os, love or passion, to open up to involvement with the 
entire cosmos. As I have indicated elsewhere, this transformation is seen 
predominantly through images of water, as the lacustrine soul’s overflow­
ing its shores and rushing down to pour itself into the cosmic ocean of 
will to power.10 In section 4 of the Prologue, Zarathustra proclaims his 
love for “him whose soul is overfull, so that he forgets himself and all 
things are in him: thus all things become his going under [death].” Later 
he speaks of the soul that loves itself most, “in which all things have 
their flow and counterflow, their ebb and flood.” “Oh my soul,” he 
exults, “nowhere is there a soul more loving and embracing and com­
prehensive than you!” (Z III, 12 and 14).
9 This idea has its roots in the “participation mystique" discussed by the French an­
thropologist Ltvy-Bnihl, referring to the so-called “primitive’s” identification with his 
environment. For an excellent account of the vicissitudes of this idea in the Western 
philosophical tradition, see Owen Barfield’s Saving the Appearances (New York: Har­
court, Brace and World).
10 Cf. part I of “The Overflowing Soul: Images of Transformation in Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra " in Man and World, vol. 16, no. 4, 1983. Imagery of waves and ocean 
is also of central importance in Buddhist characterizations of the relations between self 
and world (cf. Nishitani, G 178, E 103).
As in Buddhism, dispassion is a preliminary means for attaining com­
passion. Nishitani assimilates agape as non-differentiating love to the
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Buddhist ideal of great compassion (mahakaruna)-. Christ’s love, as 
ekkendsis, an emptying out of the self into selflessness, would be 
equivalent to the great compassion of the Buddha, a realization of £u- 
nyata in the transition from atman to anatman (G 116-120, E 58-61). 
If we do not insist on thinking of eros and agape as always opposed, 
then the love which opens up Zarathustra’s self would correspond well 
with ekkenosis and karuna.
The breakdown of the self into various multiplicities, while a theme 
common to Nietzsche and earlier Buddhism, is not as prominent in Zen. 
Zen is less interested in retracing the genealogy of the false self, and in­
stead goes straight back to the source—sunyata, ku, the nihilum, emp­
tiness, Nothing. “Behind the person,’’ writes Nishitani, “is absolutely 
nothing” (G 132, E 70). Emptiness and nothing are central topics in this 
work and are treated in a tone that is as Nietzschean as it is Heideg- 
gerian. “Where does man not stand at the edge of abysses?” asks 
Zarathustra (Z III, 2). “Constantly at the edge of an abyss,” responds 
Nishitani, “[our lives] can be annihilated any moment. ... Our ex­
istence ... vibrates over empty nothingness” (G 42, E 4). The conver­
sion of the false to the true self requires a realization—in the sense of 
both an understanding and an actualization—of the nothing that is the 
ground of the self: “Becoming aware of nothing is nothing other than 
becoming aware of the self.” And as one becomes aware of this nothing 
of the self, one realizes that it is one with the nothing that is the (abysmal) 
basis of the entire universe: “We become aware of [death and nothing] 
as concealed in the ground of all beings, in the ground of the world itself’ 
(G 59, E 16).
While “das Nichts” is more prominent in Heidegger’s texts than in 
Nietzsche’s (in Being and Time explicitly understood as the ground of 
self and world), the idea of nothing is of course central to Nietzsche’s 
nihilism. Just as there is no substance to the persons, drives and inter­
pretative energies that comprise the self, nothing behind the protean 
multiplicity of masks that make up the persona, so there is no substratum 
of reality behind the appearances—only a plethora of perspectival in­
terpretations; no core or centre; nothing the perspectives are interpreta­
tions of. “Behind every ground,” we read in aphorism 289 of Beyond 
Good and Evil, “an abyss.”
As Nishitani develops his idea of the field of emptiness {das Feld der 
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Leere), it comes to sound more and more like the cosmic play-ground 
of Nietzsche’s will to power. While all things are unified in the field of 
emptiness, this does not signify a collapse into a One “in which all 
multiplicity and differentiation is eliminated”; rather, as with Nietzsche’s 
polycentrism, “in the field of emptiness there are centres everywhere” 
(G 235, E 146). Nishitani’s subsequent elaboration of the idea of each 
thing’s being an absolute centre mirroring the entire universe admitted­
ly sounds more like (and no doubt owes more to) the Hua-yen Buddhist 
conception of the world than Nietzsche’s. But in a later discussion of 
the mutual interpenetration of all things, Nishitani writes that this in­
terrelationship is due to “the ‘force’ that gathers all things and lets them 
become one; the force which makes the world the world. The field of 
emptiness is a force-field” (G 240-241, E 150). Although the author 
has presumably approved the use of term “force” (Kraft) rather than 
“power” (Macht), his talk of “the ‘force’ that enables each individual 
thing to exist” (G 252, E 159) is strongly reminiscent of will to power.
Now this is a point at which the comparative approach can throw light 
on a somewhat inconspicuous yet important aspect of Nietzsche’s 
thought. While the idea of the interrelatedness of all things is central 
to most Buddhist thought (Nishitani calls it “ wechselseitige Durch- 
dringung” or, in the English translation, “circumincessional interpenetra­
tion”), it does not immediately appear to have a counterpart in Nietz­
sche’s philosophy. However, Mistry has drawn attention to a series of 
passages in the Nachlafi in which the account of the workings of will 
to power corresponds closely to the idea of pratitya-samutpada. In the 
first of these four notes we read, “There is no ‘being-in-itself’ (it is the 
relationships that first constitute beings)”; and in the last: “... every 
displacement of power at one place [would] condition the whole system— 
so that besides causal sequence there would be contiguous and cooperative 
dependence.”11 The same idea plays a crucial role in Zarathustra (which 
we shall look at later in connexion with the “moment”), culminating 
in the ecstatic jubilation of “The Night-Wanderer Song”: “All things 
are linked together, intertwined, enamoured!” (Z IV, 19).
11 WP 625 and 638; cf. 631 and 635 (cited in NB 74-75).
Nevertheless, one might still insist on a divergence here, in as far as 
Zen enlightenment appears to realize an intrinsic harmony to the world, 
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whereas Nietzsche argues against there being any order to the world that 
human beings have not projected into it, characterizing it instead as 
“chaos.”12 But I think his use of this word harks back to its original 
Greek meaning of “abysmal gap,” since other formulations stress the 
co-presence of order and disorder. Although Mistry quotes the 
following well known passage from the Nachlaff at some length (NB 
64-65), parts of it are worth re-quoting here, since it mirrors the Zen 
world-view even more closely than that of early Buddhism.
12 Cf., however, Nishitani: “In the field of emptiness original disharmony 
and original harmony are essentially one’’ (G 395, E 264).
13 One of the virtues of Nishitani’s book is its emphasis (with frequent reference to 
the idea of eternal recurrence) on the temporal/historical dimension of Buddhist thought, 
since Buddhism has generally been regarded as a particularly un- or a-historical religion.
[The world is] a monster of energy, without beginning, without 
end ... enclosed by “nothing” as by a boundary ... in a definite 
space, and not a space which is “empty” somewhere but rather as 
energy throughout, as a play of energy and energy-waves, at once 
one and many ... a sea of flowing and rushing energies, eternally 
changing ... [returning] out of the play of contradictions back to 
the joy of harmony ... (W<P 1067)
And just as Nishitani writes that the force-field of emptiness “opens up 
in the self, when the self is truly in its own primordial ground ... [and]... 
is always already to be found in the self” (G 252, E 159), so Nietzsche 
concludes the passage just quoted with the sentences: “ This world is will 
to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will 
to power—and nothing besides!”
We have seen that for both Nietzsche and Zen the authentic self, rather 
than being encapsulated as the ego within the confines of the body, is 
an openness that participates in the world. But as well as being a matrix 
of relationships in space, the self is also—and more importantly— 
extended through time. It is a significant feature of Nietzsche’s and 
Nishitani’s philosophies (which they share with Heidegger’s) that once 
the self is “de-substantialized” its essential nature turns out to be radically 
temporal.13
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Under the Moment-The Abyss of Eternity
For both Nietzsche and Nishitani the true self is to be thought of in 
its relation to time and eternity. If the Zen understanding of time and 
fanyata and Nietzsche’s thought of eternal recurrence have still not been 
well understood, one reason is that they are both grounded in views of 
eternity that are quite different from the traditional conceptions. The 
topic of time and eternity is abysmally deep, but perhaps we can ven­
ture into it through two sets of texts in the alchemical spirit of hoping 
to illuminate obscurum per obscurius. Since neither philosopher 
elaborates an explicit theory of time, I shall bring the final focus to bear 
on a specific image that appears central to both discussions—the image 
of a “vertical’’eternity directly beneath the moment (Augenblick) ex­
tending down into limitless depth.
The idea of time on both sides is ambiguous. In Nietzsche, the thought 
of the eternal recurrence of the same, which underlies the authentic 
understanding of time, has as it were two “faces”—a nihilistic and an 
affirmative. Similarly, for Nishitani, time presents “on the one hand the 
aspect of the creative, of freedom and of infinite possibility, and on the 
other the aspect of infinite burden, of ineluctable necessity” (G 
335-337, E 220-222). Let us look at time first from the perspective of 
nihilism/£a/7Wfir, and then from the perspective of affirmation/.fl2nyaft?.
The first published expression of the thought of eternal recurrence is 
aphorism 341 of The Gay Science. The reader is there confronted with 
the possibility of having to re-live his or her life so far—everything will 
return in precisely the same way and sequence again and again, in­
numerable times. A thought so heavy (the aphorism’s title is “The 
Greatest Weight”), if it did not crush us, would transform us as we now 
are. In a note from the Nachlap Nietzsche calls the first alternative the 
thought in its most “paralyzing” and “terrible” form: “existence, as 
it is, without meaning or aim, but inevitably recurring, without a finale 
into nothingness” (FTP 55). Combined with the idea of the irreversibili­
ty of time, the will’s impotence with respect to the “it was,” and the 
rigid predetermination of the present by the past so that nothing original 
can occur, this idea of recurrence indeed becomes crushingly nihilistic.
A corollary to a self encapsulated in space is a self concentred upon 
one point at a time in linear time: Buddhism, with its notion of karma, 
explodes the punctilinear self into a matrix of relationships extending 
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infinitely back into the past (and forward into the future). If we avoid 
taking the notion of reincarnation literally—we are helped in this by the 
self’s being and t man, which means that there is nothing substantial to 
be reincarnated, only a configuration of relationships or energies—and 
if we heed Nishitani’s injunction to understand the idea of the endless 
cycle of births and rebirths existentially, as bearing upon our present 
existence here and now (G 367, E 243), we shall find this understanding 
of the self through time remarkably similar to Nietzsche’s.
A recurrent theme in Nishitani’s book is that of “karma from begin­
ningless time,” which imposes upon us “a tremendous weight, or in­
finite burden.” The question then is: What would correspond in Nietz­
sche’s thought to such an understanding of karma*! Since Professor 
Okdchi has already given a comprehensive answer in terms of Nietzsche’s 
amor fati™ I shall restrict myself here to pointing up another aspect 
of the historical dimension of the self in Nietzsche that has not received 
much attention in the secondary literature, and which corresponds to 
Nishitani’s idea of “historical” (ge-schicht-lich) karma.
Although the idea of metempsuchosis, or transmigration of the soul, 
is central to much of ancient Greek thought, subsequent Western 
philosophy has mostly taken the position that the individual begins with 
his or her present birth. However, with Kierkegaard the idea resurfaces 
that “what is essential to human existence [is] that man is individuum 
and as such simultaneously himself and the whole race, and in such a 
way that the whole race participates in the individual and the individual 
in the whole race.”14 5 This idea is echoed a few decades later by numerous 
passages in Nietzsche, of which the following two are typical: “We are 
more than individuals: we are the whole chain as well, with the task of 
all the futures of that chain.” Again: “Every individual consists of the 
whole course of evolution (and not, as morality imagines, only of
14 RyOgi OkOchi, “Nietzsches Amor Fati im Lichte des Karma des Buddhismus,” Nietz­
sche Studien, vol. I, 1972.
15 Seren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), section 1. One finds a similar idea in such thinkers 
as Eckhart, Vico, and some of the German Naturphilosophen, but it is not until 
Kierkegaard that it leads to a central and comprehensive inquiry into the relationships 
of the self to time and eternity, in which, significantly, the idea of the moment (0jeblik- 
ket) is also crucial.
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something that begins at birth).”16
16 WP 687 and 373; the latter assertion obviously pertains only to moralities not 
based on the idea of karma. Cf. also WP 585, 678 and 686-687, and Beyond Good and 
Evil, aph. 264. This is also a central idea in Jung’s psychology, for whom “Every man, 
in a sense, represents the whole of man and his history’’ {Collected Works, vol. 8, sec­
tion 483).
17 The Gay Science, aph. 54; cf. also aph. 337.
18 WP 659. Many forms of Buddhism place a corresponding importance on the body. 
Anticipating Zarathustra’s claim (hat the body is “the true self” is the Buddha’s remark 
that it is better to regard “this body, child of the four great elements, as the self, rather 
than the mind ...” {Samyukta NikQya, ii, 94; cited in NB 59). Nishitani similarly em­
phasizes that self-realization in Zen involves “a ‘somatic [leibhafty understanding” (G 
450).
19 The Gay Science, aph. 337. The theme of the heavy responsibility imposed on us 
as heirs of the past is echoed by Heidegger’s discussion of “disposition” [Befindlichkeit] 
in Being and Time (section 29), which discloses our “thrownness” [Geworfenheit] to 
us as “a burden.” Nishitani’s interpretation of karma makes frequent reference to the 
burden of our continual “indebtedness” [ScAu/d] to our past karma (see, especially, 
chapter six).
Nietzsche has a quasi-Lamarckian understanding of the self as an ag­
glomeration of layers of the past experience of one’s ancestors, which 
implies that we live not only at one particular point in (present) time, 
but also, by virtue of a kind of vertical extension down through the layers, 
at many levels and times simultaneously. And so, all the time, “the en­
tire human and animal past continues [in usj to invent, to love, to hate 
and to infer.”17 The medium for this archaic inheritance (and here the 
psychological Lamarckism acquires a physiological turn) is the body, 
“where the entire past of all organic becoming, the most distant and 
the closest, is again vitally embodied .. .”18 When, thanks to this medium, 
one learns “to feel the entire history of mankind as one's own (hi)story” 
one becomes “[a] human being with a horizon of millennia before and 
behind him, the [responsible] heir of all nobility of the whole of past 
spirit. . .”19 Such a sense of our responsibility to our heritage is surely 
consonant with Nishitani’s understanding of the karmic weight placed 
on us by the tradition into which we are born.
Moving to the second, “affirmative” understanding of the temporality 
of the self, let us begin with the Zen understanding of the moment as 
articulated in the last two chapters of Nishitani’s book. At the begin-
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ning of his discussion of “Emptiness and Time’’ Nishitani gives expres­
sion to the idea of “momentariness” (ksanavada), an idea fundamental 
to much Buddhist thought from the beginning, in the following way: 
“We are... at every moment abysmally in time, and in embracing 
groundlessly the boundless future, we let ‘time’ temporalize itself in every 
single moment” (G 283, E 181). When one thinks away rectilinear time 
as the “frame” for the arising and passing away of all things, the idea 
of absolute duration (and also of the irreversibility of the “flow” of time) 
collapses—in such a way that birth and death as happening “in time” 
must be radically re-thought. Writing of “true” time and eternity, 
Nishitani says of life that it “consists of a chain of ‘births and deaths’ 
[and] in every moment arises anew and again perishes” (ibid.).™
At the beginning of the book’s final chapter, “Emptiness and History,” 
Nishitani returns to the question of the moment in the context of the 
idea of kalpas. He explains the Buddhist conception of “an agglomera­
tion of kalpas" partially in contradistinction to the thought of eternal 
recurrence: in the latter, “a before and after are still assumed, and in 
this succession time is simply represented as a straight line without begin­
ning or end” (G 334, E 219). The Zra/pa-system on the other hand in­
volves a multiplicity of “simultaneous” time-systems, and “in order to 
be able to speak of such as layering [Schichtung] of simultaneous time­
systems (of “history” [Ge-Schichte]) one must assume at the ground of 
time an infinite openness, an immeasurable, sky-like emptiness.”20 1 Owing 
to the agglomeration of simultaneous time-systems the moment assumes 
the peculiar characteristic that “at the ground of every ‘now* an empty 
20 Nishitani’s discussion of the continual “new arising of the ‘now”* and the “non- 
durational” character of time comes into especially sharp focus around G 337-338, E 
221-222. Stambaugh emphasizes Nietzsche’s denial of duration on pp. 7-17 of NER, 
and her discussion of the moment’s arising and perishing on pp. 114-115 is perfectly 
congruent with the Buddhist conception of “momentariness”. For a discussion of earlier 
Buddhist theories of momentariness in the light of pratitya-samutpada, see David J. 
Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Honolulu: The Univer­
sity Press of Hawaii, 1975), especially ch. VII.
21 G 334, E 219; cf. also G 252, 349, 368, 373; E 159, 230. 244, 247. Nishitani also 
doubts whether the moment in Nietzsche has “the groundlessness of the ‘moment’ in 
the true sense” (G 329, E 215-216); but we shall see shortly, I hope, that the thought 
of recurrence actually involves a remarkably similar view of the relation between the 
moment and eternity.
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expanse opens up ... so that every ‘now’ is essentially something that 
perishes and arises in every moment” (G 334, E 219).
If there is no duration, then time cannot be understood linearly, nor 
the relation between time and eternity “horizontally”—eternity as nunc 
starts, as the endless duration of a flow, or as the simultaneity of the 
“parts” of a time-line stretching from the past through the present to 
the future. Rather the relation will have to be understood “vertically” 
as an opening down of the moment into a dimension of limitless depth. 
This is a major theme of Nishitani’s book:
And this means, as I have said before, that immediately under the 
present, in the ground which comes to presence vertically in the ag­
glomerated layers of innumerable smaller and greater “world-” and 
“time-” cycles, the nihilum opens up as the place of the ek-static 
transcendence of world and time. This means that the abyss of the 
nihilum, above which the infinite recurrence runs, reveals itself as 
an infinite openness beneath the present. (G 348, E 229)
As a result of the denial of any kind of duration, eternity is transposed 
from the horizontal into the vertical dimension. It is furthermore clear 
from the above that the abyss of the nihilum which constantly breaks 
open under the moment is an opening not only into “the eternity of the 
transcendent nothingness ... of death,” but also into “the field of emp­
tiness as the field of mutual interpenetration,... which is always situated 
in the self, at hand and underfoot” (G 349, E 230; cf. G 252, E 159).
This possibility of the opening into the field of emptiness arises from 
the aspect of time which Nishitani has characterized as “the aspect of 
the creative, of freedom and of infinite possibility.” Let us now see how 
this corresponds to the second “face” of Nietzsche’s thought of eternal 
recurrence, which is realized if the thought does not crush us but 
transforms us, in that we are able to say to the demon who intimates 
to us the possibility of recurrence: “You are a God and I never heard 
anything more divine” (GS 341). To experience the thought as “the 
highest formula of affirmation that can possibly be attained,” it would 
be necessary to “take away the idea of a purpose from the process and 
nevertheless affirm the process. —This would be the case if something 
within the process were attained in every moment of it—and always the 
same” {WP 55). In order to understand how “the same” can be at­
tained “in every moment” we must reflect upon the relationship bet­
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ween the moment and the eternal recurrence. To paraphrase Joan Stam­
baugh’s interpretation: if there is no duration, the self-identity of the 
self (das Selbst) cannot be thought of in relation to the usual sense of 
“the same” (das Selbe), but only with respect to a “same” (das Gleiche) 
that recurs.
The crucial importance of the moment is expressed in another passage 
from the Nachtafi:
But then [the individual) discovers that it is itself something chang­
ing ... It discovers in its freedom the mystery that there is no in­
dividual, that in the smallest moment it is something other than in 
the next moment, and that the conditions for its existence are those 
of a huge number of individuals: the infinitely small moment is the 
higher reality and truth, a lightning-flash-image [Blitzbild] out of 
the eternal flux.22
22 Gesammelte Werke, Gropoktavausgabe, Nachlaft XII: 45.
23 Nachlap XII: 371 and XIV: 286 (cited in NER 23).
From WP 1052 we learn that “because nothing is subsistent in itself, 
neither in us nor in things,... if we say .yes to a single moment, we have 
thereby affirmed not only ourselves but all things.” This interdependence 
amongst all things lends to the moment the character of “immortali­
ty”23—paradoxically, since it is precisely the essence of the moment to 
arise and perish simultaneously.
It is in Zarathustra that the moment proves to be crucial to the thought 
of recurrence. In “On the Vision and the Riddle” (the first attempt at 
presenting the thought) Zarathustra speaks of future and past as eternal 
lanes which come together “face-to-face” and “contradict one another” 
in the gateway of the “moment.” Zarathustra asks the dwarf: “Do you 
think that these paths [of past and future] contradict one another eter­
nally?”—“All that is straight lies,” the dwarf mutters contemptuously, 
“time itself is a circle”—to which Zarathustra retorts: “Don’t make it 
too easy for yourself!” One might be inclined to think that these long 
lanes do not in fact run “backwards” and “on out” into opposing eter­
nities, but that the apparently straight line of time is rather the arc of 
a gigantic circle, and that the lanes therefore come together at an in­
finite vertical distance away. But that is too easy a solution, since the 
paths would still come together “face to face” out there, and thereby 
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still “contradict one another” (see figures 1 & 2J.24
24 Though believing with Heidegger that the problem with almost all Western theories 
of time is that they have conceived it “spatially,*’ I cannot resist the temptation to try 
to represent the idea of time and eternity in Zarathustra by means of a diagram. Sket­
ches for these figures were first drawn on a paper napkin during a lunchtime conversa­
tion with Professor Abe Masao.
25 Interestingly, there is a Zen saying concerning “striking the midnightbell at mid­
day.” The German “Brunnen" means “spring” or “fountain” as well as “well”; in 
“The Night Song” Zarathustra calls his soul “a fountain” (ein springender Brunnen). 
Nishitani writes of “[ourl self-awareness welling up from the Brunnen of beginningless 
and endless time” (G 373, E 248).
In the next chapter but one, “Before Sunrise,” the vertical dimen­
sion of eternity is introduced by a striking image which is reminiscent 
of Nishitani’s description of “the infinite openness... in the ground 
of time” as “an immeasurable, sky-like emptiness.” The chapter begins: 
“Oh heaven above me, pure! deep! You abyss of light!”: in this image 
the opposites come together—the height of heaven as the depth of the 
abyss. Shortly thereafter we hear: “For all things are baptized in the 
well of eternity,” which prefigures the culmination of the fourth book 
in “The Night-Wanderer Song.” There Zarathustra is addressed by the 
midnight-bell, whereupon he asks: “Where did time go?” Did I not sink 
into deep wells? ... My world just became perfect, midnight is also 
midday.—”25
What we need to do, then, is to understand time in such a way that 
past and future come together without contradicting one another and 
that the paths are transposed into the vertical dimension (fig. 3). Although 
one usually thinks of the directions of future and past as forward and 
back, there is a strange ambiguity to our idea of rectilinear time—between 
its flowing from the future into the past, or progressing from the past 
into the future. There is a corresponding ambiguity to the vertical 
metaphors we use to speak of past and future: things “come up” from 
the future, and are “handed down” from past tradition; and yet at the 
same time colloquial speech talks of things “coming down” from the 
future and of memories of the past “coming up.” Because of this the 
diagram can be mirrored above and below, producing a doubled image. 
The ring of recurrence then looks like two intersecting infinity signs— 
or, even more appropriately, like the butterfly of the soul (psuche), which 
“[wanders] like a heavy cloud between past and future” and of which
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Zarathustra inquires: “Where would future and past be closer together 
than in you?” (Z III, 16 and 14). Nietzsche even speaks of the “butter­
fly moment” in The Gay Science (aphorism 83).
Because Nietzsche denies any kind of horizontal duration these circles 
need to be turned through 90° into the absolutely vertical (fig. 4). Fur­
ther: by the gateway of the moment Zarathustra asks the dwarf: “And 
are all things not so firmly knotted together that this moment draws all 
coming things after it?” Later, in “The Convalescent,” the eagle and 
serpent, speaking for Zarathustra, say: “But the knot of causes in which 
I am entangled returns—and will create me again. I myself belong to 
the causes of the recurrence.” Because midnight is also midday (the way 
up and the way down—one and the same), when one steps into the 
gateway of the moment (as the dwarf did not have the courage to do), 
one realizes that eternal return does not simply mean that time is cyclical, 
but rather that everything—past, future, the whole of time, and the eternal 
recurrence itself—is in the moment (cf. NER 41). This is represented by 
the point in figure 5. And if the moment is an abysmal opening of time 
into the emptiness of eternity, it is best not imaged at all, as in figure 6.
To appreciate the existential impact of the thought of recurrence, let 
us think back to its first presentation, in The Gay Science. We should 
now have a better sense of how “The question in each and every thing, 
‘Do you want this once more and innumerable times more?’ would weigh 
upon [our] actions as the greatest weight.” And if we could bear to let 
this weight inform every single choosing of ourselves, it would 
introduce—by annihilating all extraneous and exogenous pressures on 
our decisions—an unprecedented lightness and clarity (paradoxically) into 
our choice of course. In this sense, the thought of recurrence would work 
as an existential guide in much the same way as the confrontation with 
death effected by Angst does in Being and Time.
To gather the major themes together for a final coda: on one hand, 
the heaviness of karma, Befindlichkeit as burden, the greatest weight; 
on the other, the creative openness of tiinyata, understanding as free 
projection, the light innocence of becoming; and in between, always under 
the way, the abyss of death, which discloses Being sive Nothing. So, from 
the occidental as well as the oriental perspective, our opening our selves 
to the abysmal field of emptiness does not afford absolute freedom. The 
momentum of the burden of our thrownness, the weight of tradition 
which takes the camel’s strength to bear and the power of the lion to 
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throw off, the pressure constantly exerted by karma from beginningless 
time—in short, the heavy weight of fate—this constricts and restricts even 
as it impels us continually to create our selves anew in every moment, 
in the light of our ever-present death and the prospect of eternal return.
But within such a prescribed field we are free to catch up the throw, 
carry that weight, dance under it over the abyss, project the play of 
possibilities on the openness of world and time—and let the responsible 
bearing of the burden of karma become innocent play, deadly serious, 
and love of fate. Time is the key here, the kairos the opening into eter­
nity, the moment the way back down to the ring of return, the high ground 
that falls away into the creative well-springs of the deep self.
Let me close the circle by concluding the quotation which opens this 
essay:
Oh heaven above me,... are you looking at me? You are listen­
ing to my wonderful soul?
When will you drink this drop of dew, which fell upon all 
earthly things,—when will you drink this wonderful soul—
—when, well of eternity! you serene and ghastly midday-abyss! 
When will you drink my soul back into you?
Zarathustra IV, “Midday”
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